Project challenges / verified progress
Beacon: ship it without fear

The engineering notebook

Prove what you ship

How does CI earn trust without storing long-lived secrets?

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Protect the artifact

Step 01 of 06

Understand the idea

A successful build does not prove that its contents are safe or trustworthy. Supply-chain checks record what went into an image, scan it for known issues, and verify who built or signed it.

LAYERS OF ARTIFACT TRUSTPolicy resultcritical CVEs failgateProvenancebuilder identitySLSASignaturekeyless CosignOIDCSBOMpackages namedSPDXPinned CI imagescode is fixedSHA
Each layer narrows a different attack. A signed artifact with no SBOM is opaque. A clean scan with an unpinned CI image may only prove that today's tag was friendly.
Step 01

Key technical ideas

An SBOM names the ingredients

A Software Bill of Materials lists packages, versions and relationships. It is not a vulnerability report. It is the inventory the report depends on. During a new CVE, teams with usable SBOMs can answer whether they contain the package.

Keyless signing uses identity instead of a stored key

Cosign can sign with GitLab's OIDC token, producing a certificate bound to repository, pipeline and commit. No long-lived signing key sits in secrets. That removes a leak class, but makes pipeline permissions important.

Pinned CI images stop tags from becoming invisible supply chain

A container image tag can move to new bytes. Pin CI images by digest, for example golang:1.25@sha256:..., when repeatable tooling matters.

merge request pipeline is a loaded footgun

merge request pipeline runs in the base repository context and may access secrets and write tokens. If it checks out and runs code from an untrusted fork, the fork can steal that power. Use it only for metadata operations.

A signed bakery batch
# Open the latest pipeline and inspect its job logs.
glab ci view main

The bread is not safer because the receipt exists. The receipt lets a buyer reject a batch whose ingredients, builder or signature do not match policy.

Secrets and identity in CI

MechanismLifetimeBest useMain risk

Repository secret

Until rotated

Legacy API tokens

Replay after leak

OIDC token

Minutes

Cosign, federation

Overbroad permission

CI_JOB_TOKEN

One run

GitLab API

Write scope carelessness

Commit SHA pin

Immutable

Trusted CI images

Update process needed

Technical terms used at work

  • SBOM — Machine-readable inventory of packages and files in an artifact.

  • OIDC — Short-lived identity token issued to a pipeline run.

  • SLSA — A framework for build integrity and provenance levels.

  • Critical CVE — A vulnerability severe enough that policy normally blocks release.